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Dynamics and Determinants of Credit Risk Discovery: 
Evidence from CDS and Stock Markets 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the dynamics and drivers of credit risk discovery between stock 
and CDS markets in the US. Our research is distinguished from the existing literature in three 
aspects: 1) We employ an improved method to measure the information share; 2) we discover 
new drivers of credit risk discovery; and 3) we assess the impact of central clearing 
counterparty (CCP) on the CDS market. By using the generalized information share (GIS) by 
Lien and Shrestha (2014), we address the issue that the CDS and stock prices do not have 
one-to-one cointegration relation. The empirical results support the use of GIS instead of 
more conventional measures. We also find that eliminating transitory price components 
increases the information share of the CDS market in the earlier period of the sample. The 
economic condition and funding cost turn out to affect the information share of the CDS 
market negatively. Another interesting finding is that the CDS of investment grade firms 
possess higher information shares compared to speculative grade firms. Finally, CCP seems 
to reduce the information share of CDS, which suggests that the CDS market is driven largely 
by insider trading. 
 
Keywords: credit risk discovery, determinants, generalized information share 
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G28 
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1. Introduction 
Much attention has been given to credit risk especially after the financial crisis in the 
late 2000s. Witnessing unlikely failures of many big firms, whether credit risk is priced in a 
timely manner became an important question to academics and practitioners alike. As noted 
by Norden and Weber (2009), distinct market structures and different investors may cause the 
prices of different assets to respond to credit news non-synchronously. Accordingly, it is of 
interest to identify which market reflects credit risk information first and what factors can 
explain its informational dominance. 
With respect to credit risk, three most important markets are stock, bond, and credit 
default swap (CDS) markets. While it is generally agreed that bonds lag behind stocks and 
CDS in incorporating credit risk information (e.g., Longstaff, Mithal and Neis, 2005; Forte 
and Peña, 2009), credit risk discovery leadership between stocks and CDS is still 
inconclusive. Norden and Weber (2009) argue that stocks lead CDS in most cases. This is 
supported by Forte and Peña (2009), Hilscher, Pollet and Wilson (2015), and Narayan, 
Sharma and Thuraisamy (2014). On the other hand, Acharya and Johnson (2007) document 
that CDS market tends to incorporate credit risk information first due to its severer insider 
trading. This is consistent with the findings of Xiang, Chng, and Fang (2013). Longstaff, 
Mithal and Neis (2005) claim that both markets have similar speeds to incorporate credit risk 
news, which is partially supported by Marsh and Wagner (2015) who observe that identical 
information processing speed emerges when negative firm specific news arrives. Meanwhile, 
Forte and Lovreta (2015) investigate time-varying relationship between CDS and stock 
markets in Europe during 2002-2008 and find that stocks dominate credit risk discovery 
during financial crisis while CDS impound credit risk news more quickly during tranquil 
times.  
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Identifying the factors that drive credit risk discovery is another important topic of 
credit risk discovery. Overall economic status does appear to affect informational dominance 
among markets. However, there is no consensus with regard to the direction of the impacts. 
Xiang, Chng, and Fang (2013) observe that the dominant role of CDS was enhanced during 
the sub-prime crisis. On the contrary, Forte and Lovreta (2015) find that information share of 
stocks increased during the dot-com bubble and the sub-prime crisis. They argue that this 
does not necessarily contradict insider trading hypothesis because credit condition is probably 
an important factor but not the major factor determining insider trading activities in the CDS 
market. Narayan, Sharma and Thuraisamy (2014) claim that financial crisis can induce a 
lagged market to be a credit risk discovery leader. Unlike overall credit risk level, it is 
commonly found that an adverse credit news such as credit rating downgrade is likely to be 
reflected in the CDS market first (e.g., Forte and Lovreta, 2015; Wang and Bhar, 2014). This 
finding is in line with firm-specific information hypothesis and insider trading hypothesis.
1
 
Forte and Lovreta (2015) also find that when the liquidity of a market increases, its 
information share rises as well. This is consistent with the liquidity hypothesis which 
suggests that informed trading is more likely to be operated in a more liquid market because 
traders can exploit their informational advantages without causing large price movements 
(Garbade and Silber, 1983).  
As described above, previous findings on the credit risk discovery are mixed without 
any concrete evidence to draw a conclusion and research on the governing factors has 
emerged only recently. Also, we find that there are rooms to improve the methodologies 
employed in the existing studies. In this regard, we believe it is worth giving another look at 
the credit risk discovery mechanism between markets. Hence, the aim of this paper is to 
                                                          
1
 The firm-specific information hypothesis argues that, whilst some security prices may be more sensitive to 
market-wide information, many others adjust more rapidly to firm-specific information, especially negative 
corporate-specific news. 
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provide more concrete evidence on credit risk discovery between CDS and stock markets 
with improved methodologies. By doing so, we make contributions to the field in three 
aspects. First, we improve the method to measure credit risk discovery. We observe that stock 
and CDS prices do not satisfy one-to-one cointegration relation which is an essential 
assumption of the widely used Hasbrouck (1995) information share (IS) and Gonzalo and 
Granger (1995) component share (GG). Thus, we employ Generalized Information Share 
(GIS) recently developed by Lien and Shrestha (2014). GIS does not require one-to-one 
cointegration between the pair and therefore is more suitable for our analysis. We also 
eliminate transitory components from the price in order to extract the permanent price 
component only. Credit risk is related to the permanent price component and eliminating 
transitory effects is expected to give a clearer view on credit risk discovery. We provide a 
comprehensive analysis by comparing the advanced method with the conventional methods. 
Secondly, we discover new factors that drive credit risk discovery. While existing studies 
focus mostly on individual firm characteristics, we identify macroeconomic factors such as 
financial condition index and overall funding cost that affect relative informational 
dominance between markets. Finally, we assess the impact of the introduction of central 
clearing counterparty (CCP) on the informational efficiency of CDS. We divide CDS 
contracts into two groups, i.e., centrally cleared CDS and the rest, and compare their 
information shares. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the CCP will enhance the CDS 
market efficiency, centrally cleared CDS turn out to have lower information shares.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, an improved method to 
measure credit risk discovery is introduced. This includes elimination of the transitory 
components from the price, calculation of the credit spread implied by the stock price, and 
calculation of the generalized information share. In Section 3, we discuss the determinants of 
credit risk discovery and propose three new factors that are potentially relevant to the credit 
5 
 
risk discovery between stock and CDS markets. Section 4 is devoted to empirical analyses 
using individual firm data from the US. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Credit risk discovery 
In this section, we briefly outline an improved procedure to calculate each market’s 
contribution to credit risk discovery. The procedure consists of three steps: 1) extracting 
permanent price components from the stock and CDS prices; 2) calculating implied credit 
spreads from the stock prices; 3) calculating credit risk discovery contribution of each market. 
2.1 Permanent price component  
The price we observe is driven by many factors such as permanent change in firm value 
and transitory change in liquidity. As our focus is on the credit risk component of the price 
which is based on the long-term firm value, using price as it is could obscure the pure credit 
risk component and the credit risk discovery obtained from it could be misleading. 
Eliminating any transitory effects from the price should give a more clear view on credit risk 
discovery. In fact, this was also discussed by Forte and Lovreta (2015), who eliminate 
transitory liquidity components in their robustness test. They find that removing the transitory 
component does not significantly affect the credit risk informational dominance between 
stock and CDS markets. We bring this forward and conduct all empirical analyses using two 
sets of data, i.e., original price time series and permanent price component time series.  
Similar to Forte and Lovreta (2015), we employ Gonzalo and Granger (1995) 
permanent-transitory decomposition method to eliminate transitory components from stock 
and CDS prices. We summarize the method only briefly. Interested readers are referred to 
Forte and Lovreta (2015) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995). First, specify a bivariate vector 
error-correction model (VECM) of bid and ask prices for each market. 
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∆𝐵𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝛼1𝐸𝐶𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏1𝑖𝛥𝐵𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑑1𝑖𝛥𝐴𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖1𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1         (1) 
∆𝐴𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝛼2𝐸𝐶𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏2𝑖𝛥𝐵𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑑2𝑖𝛥𝐴𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖2𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1                 (2)    (2) 
where 𝐵𝑡 and 𝐴𝑡 are respectively bid and ask prices at time 𝑡 and 𝐸𝐶𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝜆0 − 𝜆1𝐴𝑡−1 
is the error correction process. Lag 𝑘 is determined based on Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SBC). Then, the permanent price component (LP) is given by 
𝐿𝑃𝑡 =
𝛼2
𝛼2−𝛼1
𝐵𝑡 +
𝛼1
𝛼1−𝛼2
𝐴𝑡                                             (3)    (3) 
This is repeated for both stock and CDS prices. 
2.2 Implied credit spread 
Forte and Peña (2009) argue that stock prices are not consistent with CDS spreads as 
credit spreads are determined by not only stock prices but also other variables such as firm 
asset value and asset volatility. Hence, they advocate to use the credit spread implied in the 
stock price instead of stock price itself. The use of implied credit spread was also supported 
by Forte and Peña (2009) and Xiang, Chng, and Fang (2013) among others. In this paper, we 
follow Xiang, Chng, and Fang (2013) and adopt Finger, Finkelstein, Lardy, Pan, Ta, and 
Tierney (2002) CreditGrades model to derive implied credit spread (ICS). Unlike other 
structural models, the CreditGrades model does not suffer from the underpricing problem and 
thus has been widely used in the literature in extracting implied credit risk information (e.g., 
Bystrom, 2006; Yu, 2006). However, apart from the stock price, stock return volatility, debt 
per share, and risk-free rate, many other key parameters in CreditGrades model such as the 
recovery rate and the mean and standard deviation of the global recovery rate are not directly 
observable. Following Ou, Chlu, and Metz (2011) we use the Moody’s average historical 
recovery rate on senior unsecured debt as a proxy for recovery rate and set the recovery rate 
𝑅 = 0.374. Given the absence of industry guidelines for setting the mean (?̅?) and standard 
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deviation (𝜆) of the global recovery rate, we calibrate both 𝐿 ̅ and 𝜆 to minimize the sum of 
squared difference between CDS and ICS using the first 20 daily observations and then apply 
the calibrated parameters for the rest of the sample. 
[?̅?𝑖
∗, 𝜆𝑖
∗] = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ (𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝑗(?̅?𝑖, 𝜆𝑖) − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
220
𝑗=1              (4)   (4) 
Further details of CreditGrades and the calculation of ICS are provided in Appendix A. 
2.3 Generalized information share 
Once the time series of CDS and ICS are obtained, the contribution of each market to 
credit risk discovery can be calculated. The most commonly used methods are Hasbrouck 
(1995) information share (IS) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) component share (GG). Both 
IS and GG are established under the assumption that the common factor shared by 
interrelated markets have the same long-run equilibrium price, i.e., one-to-one cointegration. 
However, this assumption is realistic only for almost identical assets such as cross-listed 
stocks. In fact, as shown in Section 4, CDS and ICS do not satisfy one-to-one cointegration 
relationship. Also, IS suffers from variable ordering issue so that it cannot provide a unique 
price discovery contribution measure. This motivates us to employ the alternative measure 
that has been recently developed by Lien and Shrestha (2014), which is unique and does not 
require one-to-one cointegration. It only requires that all the 𝐼(1) time series share one and 
only one common trend. We employ this generalized information share (GIS) measure as our 
main toolkit for credit risk discovery analysis and compare it with IS and GG measures 
throughout. The rest of this section briefly describes calculation of IS, GG, and GIS measures.  
First, specify the VECM of CDS and ICS as follow: 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝛼1𝐸𝐶𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏1𝑖𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑑1𝑖𝛥𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖1𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1     (5)    (5) 
∆𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝛼2𝐸𝐶𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏2𝑖𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑑2𝑖𝛥𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖2𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1      (6)    (6) 
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where 𝐸𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜆0 − 𝜆1𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑡−1. 𝜆 = [1, −𝜆1]
′  implies the long-run equilibrium 
relationship between CDS and ICS. Let 𝛼 = [𝛼1, 𝛼2]
′, with 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 denote the short-run 
adjustment speeds. Let 𝜖𝑡 = [𝜖1𝑡,  𝜖2𝑡]
′ and 𝐸[𝜖𝑡𝜖𝑡
′] = 𝛺. Equation (5) and (6) can be rewritten 
in the vector moving average form 
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝐶𝐷𝑆0 + 𝜓1(1) ∑ 𝜖1𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 + 𝜓1
∗(𝐿)𝜖1𝑡                            (7)    (7) 
𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝐶𝑆0 + 𝜓2(1) ∑ 𝜖2𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 + 𝜓2
∗(𝐿)𝜖2𝑡                              (8)    (8) 
where 𝜓i(1), i = 1,2,  are the sum of the moving average coefficients. Let 𝛹(1) =
[𝜓1(1), 𝜓2(1)]
′ . The Engle-Granger representation theorem implies that 𝜆′𝛹(1) = 0 and 
𝛹(1)𝛼 = 0. Under the assumption that 𝜆 = [1, −1]′, 𝛹(1) has identical rows. Let 𝜓 be the 
identical row of 𝛹(1). Hasbrouck (1995) information share (IS) and Gonzalo and Granger 
(1995) component share (GG) are defined as: 
𝐼𝑆𝑗 =
[𝜓𝐹]𝑗
2
𝜓𝛺𝜓′
,  𝐺𝐺𝑗 = [
𝛼2
𝛼2−𝛼1
,
𝛼1
𝛼1−𝛼2
]
′
                                                       (9) 
where 𝐹 is the Cholesky factorisation of 𝛺. We adopt Baillie, Booth, Tse, and Zabotina (2002) 
approach and approximate a unique IS as the midpoint of the upper and lower bounds. 
Following Forte and Lovreta (2015), we replace the GG values that exceed the range [0, 1] 
with the boundary values. 
For GIS, the factor structure of 𝜖𝑡  focuses on the diagonalization of the correlation 
matrix rather than the covariance matrix 𝛺 . Denote 𝛷 as the correlation matrix of the 
residuals and Λ as a diagonal matrix which consists of the eigenvalues of 𝛷 on the diagonal. 
The corresponding eigenvectors construct a matrix 𝐺. Let 𝑊 be a diagonal matrix having the 
standard deviations of the residuals on the diagonal. The cointegrating vector is unrestricted 
so that 𝜆 = [1, −𝜆1]
′ for an arbitrary 𝜆1. Let 𝜓𝑗
𝜆 be the 𝑗-th row of 𝛹(1). According to the 
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Engle-Granger representation theorem, 𝜓1
𝜆 = 𝜆𝑗−1𝜓𝑗
𝜆, 𝑗 = 1,2, with 𝜆0 = 1. Then, GIS can 
be computed as: 
𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑗 =
(𝜓𝑗
𝐺)
2
𝜓1
𝜆𝛺(𝜓1
𝜆)′
                                                                  (10) 
where 𝜓𝐺 = 𝜓1
𝜆𝐹𝑀, 𝐹𝑀 = [𝐺Λ−0.5𝐺′𝑊−1]−1, 𝜖𝑡 = 𝐹
𝑀𝑧𝑡, 𝐸[𝑧𝑡] = 0 and 𝐸[𝑧𝑡𝑧𝑡
′] = 𝐼2.  
IS, GG, and GIS generally range from 0 to 1. The higher values of these measures 
indicate the higher contributions of the related asset prices to price discovery. To highlight 
the differences among these measures, we borrow Figucrola-Ferrctti, Gilbert, and Yan 
(2014)’s illustration: IS offers the greatest weight to the market incorporating the newest 
information, but the market with greatest IS cannot necessarily provide the best benchmark 
for the implicit efficient price. GG measures the extent to which the different market prices 
reflect the long-run equilibrium price. Hence, the dominant market identified by GG would 
offer the best price for the fundamental price. GIS imposes a different factor structure on the 
residuals and its factor decomposition is similar to principal component analysis. The price of 
market with the greatest GIS can be interpreted as a weighted average of all market prices, 
approximating the efficient price. 
 
3. Determinants of credit risk discovery 
Previous studies have found that neither the stock market nor the CDS market 
consistently dominates the other in credit risk discovery (e.g., Forte and Lovreta, 2015; Xiang, 
Chng, and Fang, 2013). Rather, as the participants of each market react differently to 
information flow, credit risk discovery mechanism seems to be largely affected by the overall 
economic status as well as individual firm characteristics. Most existing studies are devoted 
to identify firm specific events such as credit rating downgrade that affect the dynamics of 
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credit risk discovery. When examining the effect of macroeconomic status on credit risk 
discovery, they rely on the use of dummy variable or sub-period analysis to indicate financial 
crises. However, these methods are unreliable due to arbitrary dating issue. Our aim is to 
identify continuous macroeconomic indicators that have potential impacts on the dynamics of 
credit risk discovery. With the evidences from previous studies, it seems obvious that the 
dynamics of credit risk discovery depends on the overall economic condition. In particular, 
when the economy is under stress, increased insolvency rate will increase demand for CDS, 
and the high and volatile CDS spreads may attract arbitragers and speculators with inside 
information. Consequently, more information will flow into the CDS market and it is 
expected to become the primary market of credit risk discovery. Based on this conjecture, we 
consider a financial condition index as a potential driver of credit risk discovery. Among the 
existing financial condition indexes, we choose Bloomberg Financial Condition Index 
(BFCIUS) and Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index (GSFCI). A lower BFCIUS or a 
higher GSFCI indicate a higher level of stress in the US financial markets.  
Another factor that is likely to affect the dynamics of credit risk discovery is funding 
cost. CDS transaction requires a relatively high margin. For example, according to the margin 
requirements for credit default swaps set by Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA), shorting a 5-year single-name CDS contract requires a margin of 4% to 25% of the 
CDS spread. Margin requirement for speculative-grade CDS can be three to six times higher 
than those for investment-grade CDS. Thus, when the funding cost is high and volatile, 
traders would prefer the stock market to the CDS market. Consequently, it is anticipated that 
a rise in funding cost will result in an increased contribution of the stock market to credit risk 
discovery. Following Acharya, Schaefer, and Zhang (2015), the spread between 3-month 
financial commercial paper interest rate and 3-month T-bill rate is chosen as a proxy for 
funding cost (FC).  
11 
 
In December 2009, ICE Clear Credit, the first CDS clearing house launched by the 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), started single-name CDS central clearing service for the US 
market.
2
 In general, central clearing counterparty (CCP) is expected to enhance CDS market 
transparency and accelerate CDS transaction settlement. However, distinct views exist about 
whether CCPs can effectively promote CDS market efficiency. On the one hand, Duffie and 
Zhu (2011) argue that introducing CCPs in CDS market only and constructing multiple CCPs 
instead of a unique CCP will reduce bilateral netting benefits and raise counterparty risk, 
unless CDS market becomes large enough. They also point out that most contract information 
still remains confidential and CCPs may not supply needed transparency to the CDS traders. 
On the other hand, Acharya and Bisin (2014) theoretically show that by disclosing trade 
positions of counterparties, CCPs can lower counterparty risk. Loon and Zhong (2014) 
empirically confirm that introducing CCPs reduces counterparty risk, decreases systemic risk, 
and improves CDS post-trade transparency. Using a dummy variable for CCP cleared CDS 
(which takes value of 1 from the first clearing date for the clearable CDS and 0 otherwise) we 
investigate whether CCPs can facilitate CDS market in detecting credit risk news. 
We construct a panel regression equation using the three factors proposed above, i.e., 
financial condition index (FCI), funding cost (FC), and CCP dummy (CCP). We also include 
four factors found significant in Forte and Lovreta (2015) as control variables. The four 
control variables are relative market liquidity between CDS and stock markets (RML), credit 
condition of reference entity (CCON), relative frequency of adverse shocks (ADS3), and 
credit rating downgrades events (CRDOWN). We compute the bid-ask spreads relative to the 
                                                          
2
 There are two approved CCPs in the US, the ICE Clear Credit (previously called the ICE Trust) and the CME 
Group. The clearable instruments of the ICE Clear Credit include both single-name corporate CDS contracts and 
CDS indices (ICE, 2015), whereas the CME Group only involve in clearing CDS indices (CME, 2015). Since 
we focus only on single-name corporate CDS contracts, all the clearable CDS contracts in our sample are 
cleared by the ICE Clear Credit.  
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mid-quote price for the stock market and the CDS market, respectively, and average them 
over the past 120 days. RML is defined as the ratio of the average stock bid-ask spread to the 
average CDS bid-ask spread. CCON is defined as the time-varying mean of the CDS spreads, 
calculated from the 120-day rolling window. ADS3 is defined by the equation 
ADS3 =
No.  of ((xt−x̅)>3∗σ) 
120
        (11) 
where xt is CDS spread at time t, and x̅ and σ are sample mean and standard deviation of the 
CDS spread obtained from the sample [xt−120, … , xt−1]. CRDOWN takes value of 1 if a 
credit rating downgrade occurs during the past 120 days and 0 otherwise. The final panel 
regression equation has the form: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐷𝑆3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑅𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐶𝑡 +
           𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                       (12)  
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a measure for the information share (GIS, IS, or GG) of CDS of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡.  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 The data 
The sample consists of liquid US dollar-denominated 5-year CDS contracts written on 
senior unsecured debts from January 1
st
 2006 to December 31
st
 2013. As our focus is on 
corporate level, CDS contracts on sovereigns are excluded. CDS contracts on financial firms 
are also excluded due to their distinguished capital structures. Given the changes in contract 
and convention since the 2009 CDS ‘Big Bang’, ex-restructuring clauses are preferred. 
Finally, we consider only active CDS contracts by excluding the firms whose CDS data are 
consecutively unavailable for more than 90 business days within one year. After filtering, our 
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sample is comprised of 113 non-financial firms from 9 industry sectors. Daily CDS quote 
data are collected from two data sources: CMA DataStream (before September 30
th
 2010) and 
Markit TickHistory (from September 30
th
 2010).
3
 In addition, financial data of stock market, 
such as stock prices, market capitalizations, and liabilities, are obtained from Bloomberg.  
All the data required for the empirical analysis and their sources are summarized in 
Table 1. Figure 1 displays the distributions of the firms in the sample across credit ratings and 
industry classifications. Credit ratings are based on the S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer 
Credit Ratings as of 31/12/2013. Among 113 firms, 94 firms (83%) are investment-grade 
firms (BBB or higher) and 19 firms (17%) are speculative-grade firms (BB or lower). The 
firms are spread across industries with no highly concentrated industry. The largest sector is 
Consumer Discretionary with 28 firms (25%).  
The remainder of the section presents the results of the empirical analysis. Throughout 
the paper, CDS refers to either CDS itself or CDS spread depending on the context, and ICS 
refers to the credit spread implied by the stock price. LCDS and LICS respectively refer to 
the CDS and the ICS obtained from the permanent price components after eliminating 
transitory components. 
4.2 Credit risk discovery 
4.2.1 CDS and ICD time series 
Descriptive statistics of CDS and ICS are reported in Tables 2 and 3, and the cross-
sectional means of CDS and ICS are plotted in Figure 2. As shown in the Figure, CDS and 
                                                          
3
 Due to a contract issue, CMA CDS data are available in DataStream only until September 30th 2010. In 
TickHistory, the majority of Markit CDS data are available after November 1st 2010. Mayordomo, Peña, and 
Schwartz (2013) compare five CDS databases, GFI, Fenics, Reuters EOD, CMA, and Markit, and find that 
CMA and Markit are more consistent with each other. Loon and Zhong (2014) also show that between 2009 and 
2011, differences between CDS spreads provided by CMA and Markit are negligible for the US single-name 
CDS market. Hence, we expect that the merge of two databases should not influence our results significantly. 
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ICS share similar development patterns except for the financial crisis period in 2009-2010: 
while CDS returns to its previous level quickly, ICS remains high for an extended period. 
This results in ICS about 40bp higher than CDS: 176.6 (LCIS) vs 137.3 (LCDS) and 173.7 
(CIS) vs 136.0 (CDS). Although short-term discrepancies exist between each pair of credit 
spreads during some periods, the generally comparable dynamics imply the existence of 
cointegration in most pairs. Comparing the two graphs in Figure 2, it appears that eliminating 
transitory components from the prices does not make substantial differences. From Table 2, 
the overall credit spreads increase slightly after eliminating transitory components; 1.26 bp 
for CDS and 2.87 bp for ICS. Nevertheless, the difference is more distinguishable at 
individual firm level (not reported here). In general, when the credit spread level is high, its 
standard deviation is high as well. This is also true across credit ratings as shown in Table 3. 
Except for the reversal between B and CCC, a higher grade is associated with a lower credit 
spread and a lower credit spread variation. 
4.2.2 Unit-root and cointegration test 
We first test whether CDS and ICS follow 𝐼(1) processes using Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) unit root test. We also test one-to-one cointegration between CDS and ICS by 
testing stationarity of their difference: if CDS and ICS are one-to-one cointegrated, the 
difference should be stationary. The results are summarized in Table 4.
4
 The test statistics 
show that CDS and ICS are 𝐼(1) processes and they do not satisfy one-to-one cointegration 
assumption in most cases. This justifies our choice of GIS over IS or GG measures.  
After testing unit-root, we proceed to detect the long-run cointegration relations using 
Johansen cointegration test. The number of lags is determined by SBC. As shown in Table 5, 
cointegration is detected in 60% of the firms for LCDS-LICS pairs and 71% of the firms for 
                                                          
4
 The full test results are available upon request. 
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CDS-ICS pairs. However, failure to detect cointegration using statistical tests does not 
necessarily imply the non-existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. The power of 
cointegration tests depend on sample periods. The shorter sample period, the less 
cointegration pairs (Forte and Lovreta, 2015). Thus, to avoid omitting any possible 
cointegration relations, we opt to keep all the firms in our sample regardless of the test results. 
Nevertheless, in section 4.4, we examine the sensitivity of our results by repeating the 
estimations for a sub-sample of firms for which cointegration relation does exist. 
4.2.3 Contribution to credit risk discovery 
The contribution of each market to credit risk discovery is measured by three measures, 
i.e., GIS, IS, and GG. These measures are updated daily using a 120-day rolling window. The 
cross-sectional averages of GIS, IS, and GG of CDS are plotted in Figure 3. More detailed 
views of these measures are also reported in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 is for the results from 
LCDS and LICS and Table 7 is for the results from CDS and ICS. As the two sets of results 
are similar, we base our analysis on the results of LCDS and LICS.  
First, when we compare the measures, it appears that all three measures offer 
qualitatively similar patterns. This is consistent with the findings of Lien and Shrestha (2014) 
and Xiang, Chng, and Fang (2013). However, it is noteworthy that the level of GIS is 
generally higher than that of the other two measures. For instance, the average GIS over the 
whole sample period is 0.45 whereas the average IS is 0.37 and the average GG is 0.33. 
These values by themselves do not tell us which measure should be favoured over others. 
Nevertheless, if we consider the fact that current markets are fairly efficient, GIS measure 
which is closer to 0.5 seems more reasonable. During the entire sample period, the firms for 
which the average information share of CDS is larger than 0.5 is 31% based on GIS. This 
value is only 8% based on IS and 7% based on GG, which is unrealistic. Also, GIS has a 
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lower volatility over time and less extreme values. All these observations, at least partially, 
support using GIS for credit risk discovery analysis.  
Based on GIS results, the contribution of the CDS market to credit risk discovery is 
generally smaller than the stock market save for the sub-prime crisis period. During the crisis 
(2008.2 - 2010.1), the contribution of the CDS market rises and it often dominates the stock 
market. This finding is robust for both types of credit spreads. Xiang et al. (2013) also find a 
positive relationship between the contribution of the swap market and economic instability.  
A close look at Table 6 reveals an interesting point. While the variation of the number 
of firms for which CDS is the credit discovery leader (GIS of CDS > 0.5) is large over time, 
GIS is relatively stable over time. This is same for other measures. This implies that even 
when the credit risk discovery leadership is handed over from one market to the other, the 
relative informational dominance does not change much. 
On average, eliminating transitory price components does not alter the results 
substantially. However, if we look at the change at individual firm level, the impact is rather 
striking. Figure 4 highlights the change of credit risk discovery leadership after eliminating 
transitory components. Overall, there are more firms for which the credit risk discovery 
leadership is handed over from stock to CDS. This is more apparent in the earlier period of 
the sample, especially before the sub-prime crisis. This suggests that the role of CDS market 
in credit risk discovery was more important than normally believed when it was loosely 
regulated. 
To investigate whether credit rating has an effect on credit risk information share, we 
divide the firms into two groups, investment grade firms and speculative grade firms, and 
compute GIS for each group. The results are summarized in Table 8 and the cross-sectional 
average of GIS for each group is plotted in Figure 5. It can be clearly seen that the 
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information share of CDS is higher for the investment grade firms. As shown in the figure, it 
is also less volatile during the sample period. This might result from higher liquidity of the 
CDS contracts of these firms. However, given the relatively small number of firms with a 
speculative grade, more evidence is needed to draw a conclusion.  
We also compare the firms whose CDS are centrally cleared with the rest of the firms. 
This should provide some information about the impact of the CCP on the CDS market 
efficiency. The results are summarized in Table 9. Since the first CCP was introduced in late 
2009, the sample period starts from 2010. Although the difference between two groups is 
often large in each period, no discernible pattern is observed. In fact, the overall information 
share of the CCP-cleared CDS is smaller than that of non-cleared CDS. This result 
contradicts the positive effects of CCPs found by Loon and Zhong (2014) and casts a doubt 
on the function of CCPs. 
4.3 Determinants of credit risk discovery 
We first examine the correlations between regressors and find all the pairs have a 
correlation coefficient within (-0.5, 0.5), which implies no multicollinearity problem. Based 
on Hausman test, the panel equation is estimated by using fixed-effects model.
5
 The 
regression results for LCDS are reported in Table 10.
6
 
It turns out that the coefficients of all the independent variables are significant and 
mostly have the expected signs. BFCIUS, a financial condition index which is positively 
correlated with the financial condition, has a negative sign. This suggests that the information 
share of CDS increases when the financial markets are under significant stress. This is 
                                                          
5
 Given that the macro variables, e.g., BFCIUS and FC, do not vary across different firms, we do not include 
time fixed effects in the regression estimations and only consider firm fixed effects.  
6
 We repeated the same regression using CDS data but the results were similar except CRDOWN became 
insignificant for GIS. The results are available upon request. 
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consistent with our previous results in which we observed increased information share of 
CDS during the sub-prime crisis. Xiang, Chng, and Fang (2013) also draw a similar 
conclusion whereas Forte and Lovreta (2015) find the opposite in the European markets. The 
funding cost is significant and has a negative relationship with the information share of CDS. 
This result was anticipated as higher funding cost would prevent investors from entering the 
CDS market resulting in slow information flow into the market. 
The CCP dummy is significant and has a negative coefficient. This is against the 
general belief that CCP will enhance the efficiency and transparency of the CDS market. This 
result was already anticipated in the previous section where CCP-cleared CDS were found to 
have lower information shares. A possible explanation for this is given by Acharya and 
Johnson (2007) who argue that higher level of information asymmetry motives insiders to 
trade CDS rather than stock, whereas more transparent CDS market may reduce their profits. 
Other researchers also express doubts about the efficiency of CCP, see Duffie and Zhu (2011) 
and Marsh and Wagner (2015), for example. Overall, the result supports the hypothesis that 
the CDS market is driven largely by insider trading. 
As to the four control variables, the results of CRDOWN and CCON are consistent 
with the findings of Forte and Lovreta (2015). Also, when the liquidity of the CDS market 
becomes relatively higher (high RML), GIS, GG and IS of the CDS market increase 
significantly. However, the results of ADS3 contradict the results found in Forte and Lovreta 
(2015). Although both CRDOWN and ADS3 measure negative credit events, our findings 
imply that the credit risk measured by ADS3 is less severe than credit downgrades, and the 
information is still impounded in the stock market first.  
 
4.4 Robustness check 
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To check the robustness of our results against the conjecture that cointegration relation 
generally exists for all the firms in our sample, we conduct a sub-sample analysis by 
excluding the firms for which cointegration relation does not exist statistically. Figure 6 
compares the average GIS of all firms with the average GIS of the firms with cointegration. It 
confirms that the calculation of the generalized information share (GIS) measure is not 
sensitive to the existence of significant cointegration relationship. The panel regression 
results presented in Table 11 also support our initial conclusions drawn from the full sample. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we investigate the dynamics and drivers of credit risk discovery between 
stock and CDS markets in the US from 2006 to 2013. Our research is distinguished from the 
existing literature in several aspects: 1) We employ an improved method to measure the 
information share; 2) we discover new drivers of credit risk discovery; and 3) we assess the 
impact of CCP on the CDS market. 
CDS spreads and the implied credit spreads from the stock prices do not satisfy one-to-
one cointegration which is an essential assumption of Hasbrouck (1995) information share 
(IS) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) component share (GG). We address this issue by 
employing the generalized information share (GIS) proposed by Lien and Shrestha (2014), 
which is free from one-to-one cointegration assumption. The empirical results suggest that 
GIS is a more suitable measure for the credit risk discovery analysis between stock and CDS 
markets. When GIS is used, the relative informational dominance becomes much less 
extreme than when IS or GG is used. We also eliminate transitory components from the 
prices to obtain pure credit risk components. This exercise has a substantial impact on the 
results in the earlier period, possibly because the CDS market was less efficient back then. 
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We propose financial condition index and funding cost as potential drivers of credit risk 
discovery and they both turn out to be significant. The empirical results suggest that the 
information share of the stock market is generally higher but the role of the CDS market 
becomes bigger when the economy is suffering. Higher funding cost adversely affects the 
information share of the CDS market. We also find that the CDS of investment grade firms 
possess higher information shares compared to speculative grade firms. Finally, we do not 
find an evidence that CCP enhances the efficiency and transparency of the CDS market. 
Rather, we find that CCP reduces the information share of CDS which supports insider 
trading hypothesis. 
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Appendix A: CreditGrades Model and Implied Credit Spread (ICS) 
According to Finger, Finkelstein, Lardy, Pan, Ta, and Tierney (2002), CreditGrades model 
introduces randomness to default barrier although the distribution of default barrier is time-
invariant. Also, in comparison with other structural credit risk models, CreditGrades model is 
more practical and easier for implementation as it links most of the model parameters, e.g., 
asset value and asset volatility, to market observables (Xiang, Chng, and Fang, 2013). In 
order to extract implied credit spreads from equity market, survival probability is calculated 
and then survival probability is converted to stock implied credit spreads. The first step is to 
obtain survival probability. Assume asset value V follows a Geometric Brownian Motion:  
𝑑𝑉𝑡
𝑉𝑡
= 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡 + 𝜇𝐷𝑑𝑡                                                                    (A.1) 
where 𝑊𝑡 is a standard Brownian motion and has the distribution 𝑊𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝑡). 𝜎 is the asset 
volatility and 𝜇𝐷 is the asset expected mean. Default barrier is defined as the amount of the 
firm’s assets remaining when default occurs, which is equal to the recovery value that the 
debt holders receive, 𝐿 ∙ 𝐷, where 𝐿 follow a time-independent lognormal distribution with 
mean ?̅? and percentage standard deviation 𝜆.  
?̅? = 𝐸𝐿, 𝜆2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿), 𝐿𝐷 = ?̅?𝐷𝑒𝜆𝑍−𝜆
2/2                                       (A.2) 
where Z~𝑁(0,1) and 𝑍 is independent of the Brownian motion 𝑊𝑡. 𝑍 is unknown until the 
time of default. For an initial asset value 𝑉0, default occurs once  
𝑉0𝑒
𝜎𝑊𝑡−𝜎
2𝑡/2 < ?̅?𝐷𝑒𝜆𝑍−𝜆
2/2                                                 (A.3) 
The survival probability of the company at time 𝑡 is given by the probability that the asset 
value does not touch the default barrier before time 𝑡. Denote a process as 𝑋𝑡, 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜎𝑊𝑡 −
𝜎2𝑡
2
− 𝜆𝑍 −
𝜆2
2
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑡 > 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐿𝐷
𝑉0
) − 𝜆2, when 𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑋𝑡~𝑁 (−
𝜎2𝑡
2
−
𝜆2
2
, 𝜎2𝑡 + 𝜎2𝜆2) 
(A.4) 
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The survival probability up to time 𝑡 is given by 
𝑃(𝑡) = 𝛷 (−
𝐴𝑡
2
+
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑑)
𝐴𝑡
) − 𝑑 ∙ 𝛷 (−
𝐴𝑡
2
−
log(𝑑)
𝐴𝑡
),                                (A.5)  
where 𝛷(∙) is the cumulative distribution function, 𝑑 =
𝑉0
?̅?𝐷
𝑒𝜆
2
 and 𝐴𝑡
2 = 𝜎2𝑡 + 𝜆2. Denoting 
the density function of default 𝑓(𝑡) = −
𝑑𝑃(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
, the cumulative default probability up to time 𝑡 
is given by 1 − 𝑃(0) + ∫ d𝑠𝑓(𝑠)
𝑡
0
, and the present value of the loss compensation by a CDS 
with maturity 𝑡 is given by (1 − 𝑅) [1 − 𝑃(0) + ∫ 𝑓(𝑠) ∙ 𝑒−𝑟𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠], where 𝑟 is the risk-free 
rate and 𝑅 is the recovery rate of the underlying debt.  
The CDS stops paying its spread when the underlying debt defaults and therefore the present 
value of the spread payments is given by 
𝐼𝐶𝑆 ∫ 𝑃(𝑠)
𝑡
0
∙ 𝑒−𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑠,                                                     (A.6) 
where ICS is the spread of the CDS. The price of the CDS is the difference between the 
discounted spreads and loss compensation: 
𝐶𝐷𝑆 = (1 − 𝑅) [1 − 𝑃(0) + ∫ 𝑓(𝑠) ∙ 𝑒−𝑟𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠] − 𝐼𝐶𝑆 ∫ 𝑃(𝑠)
𝑡
0
∙ 𝑒−𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑠.        (A.7) 
For the value of the CDS to be zero at time t = 0, the following should hold: 
(1 − 𝑅)(1 − 𝑃(0)) − (
𝐼𝐶𝑆
𝑟
) (𝑃(0) − 𝑃(𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡) = − (1 − 𝑅 +
𝐼𝐶𝑆
𝑟
) 𝑒𝑟𝜉[𝐺(𝑡 + 𝜉) − 𝐺(𝜉)]               
(A.8)  
with 𝜉 =
𝜆2
𝜎2
, 𝐺(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑧+
1
2 𝛷 (−
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑑)
𝜎√t
− 𝑧𝜎√𝑡) + 𝑑
−𝑧+
1
2 𝛷 (−
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑑)
𝜎√𝑡
+ 𝑧𝜎√𝑡) , and 𝑧 =
√
1
4
+
2𝑟
𝜎2
. Solving for 𝐼𝐶𝑆, we obtain:  
𝐼𝐶𝑆 = 𝑟(1 − 𝑅) [
1−𝑃(0)+𝐻(𝑡)
𝑃(0)−𝑃(𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡−𝐻(𝑡)
] , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐻(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑟𝜉(𝐺(𝑡 + 𝜉) − 𝐺(𝜉)).              (A.9) 
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Table 1  
Data sources  
This table summarizes the data required for empirical analysis and their sources. CDS quotes 
are collected from two data sources as none of them covers the whole sample period. 
BFCIUS, GSFCI, and CCP respectively refer to the Bloomberg Financial Condition Index, 
Goldman Sachs Financial Condition Index, and the central clearing counterparty.  
Category  Data  Source  
CDS market CDS quotes (<30/09/2010) 
CDS quotes (≥30/09/2010) 
Datastream 
TickHistory 
Stock market Stock quotes  
Market capitalization 
Liabilities 
Minority interests 
Preferred shares 
Bloomberg 
Risk-free rate 5-year swap rate Datastream 
Firm characteristics Credit rating 
Industry classification 
Compustat 
Determinants BFCIUS 
GSFCI 
3M CP and 3M T-bill 
CCP Clearing dates 
Bloomberg 
Bloomberg 
FRB reports 
ICE Clear Credit 
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics of CDS and ICS  
This table reports descriptive statistics of CDS and ICS along the sample period. LCDS and 
LICS respectively refer to the CDS and the ICS obtained from the permanent price 
components after eliminating transitory components. All the credit spreads are expressed in 
basis points. 
 LCDS LICS 
 Mean  Std Min Max Mean  Std Min Max 
2006 50.04 83.97 0.20 976.41 112.23 154.54 0.32 1240.10 
2007 59.56 111.60 1.70 1853.60 104.57 175.59 0.12 1176.29 
2008 169.10 323.15 13.00 10210.71 187.64 273.37 0.27 2907.39 
2009 191.04 474.20 14.14 14475.64 438.26 375.64 3.62 2665.26 
2010 123.67 116.28 21.26 780.94 150.54 186.05 0.58 1176.62 
2011 145.39 147.51 20.45 1128.45 120.80 161.16 0.30 1085.66 
2012 162.03 223.63 15.20 2427.62 149.17 192.75 0.15 1372.41 
2013 126.45 198.55 11.50 2279.32 100.35 161.76 0.06 1331.56 
All 128.09 251.13 0.20 14475.64 172.23 248.09 0.06 2907.39 
 CDS ICS 
 Mean  Std Min Max Mean  Std Min Max 
2006 50.72 84.77 2.50 987.50 63.30 119.91 0.37 1232.66 
2007 60.54 114.34 2.90 1958.60 72.12 150.77 0.09 1164.68 
2008 171.40 338.09 15.50 11095.00 198.07 280.98 0.28 2946.19 
2009 192.29 478.50 15.61 14624.75 460.33 385.46 3.56 2701.16 
2010 123.77 116.95 20.50 793.07 158.55 188.68 0.59 1181.32 
2011 141.74 145.57 19.50 1112.69 126.80 161.17 0.31 1085.01 
2012 157.10 215.96 11.50 2259.00 155.51 193.68 1.10 1373.11 
2013 122.37 191.64 9.36 2182.90 103.45 163.20 0.38 1332.48 
All 127.24 253.28 2.50 14624.75 168.69 253.47 0.09 2946.19 
 
 
 
 
  
28 
 
Table 3  
Descriptive statistics of CDS and ICS – credit ratings  
This table reports descriptive statistics of CDS and ICS across credit ratings. LCDS and LICS 
respectively refer to the CDS and the ICS obtained from the permanent price components 
after eliminating transitory components. All the credit spreads are expressed in basis points. 
 LCDS LICS 
 Mean  Std Min Max Mean  Std Min Max 
AAA 26.17 18.03 0.20 117.39 17.80 27.32 0.32 152.88 
AA 43.25 31.82 2.00 225.12 37.35 41.07 1.09 285.45 
A 50.10 30.82 4.78 350.00 81.99 119.11 0.06 1006.36 
BBB 129.84 294.61 4.97 14475.64 168.25 222.14 0.43 2907.39 
BB 252.68 181.89 25.00 1697.53 310.11 320.53 0.29 1590.63 
B 520.96 589.18 24.80 12033.19 691.81 334.93 39.48 2093.80 
CCC 452.14 517.47 35.70 2427.62 313.29 219.43 37.98 899.65 
 CDS ICS 
 Mean  Std Min Max Mean  Std Min Max 
AAA 25.81 18.10 2.50 115.00 22.71 27.15 0.68 152.51 
AA 39.18 26.24 3.00 180.00 38.73 43.64 1.42 299.38 
A 49.46 30.71 5.50 360.00 80.05 122.15 0.09 1014.04 
BBB 129.41 299.72 7.40 14624.75 161.75 230.11 0.47 2946.19 
BB 252.91 183.79 26.50 1717.03 333.26 349.85 7.58 1958.61 
B 517.54 576.74 26.50 11877.19 658.68 322.05 37.42 1373.11 
CCC 434.96 492.23 34.20 2259.00 339.11 238.00 24.95 926.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
29 
 
Table 4  
Unit-root test  
This table summarises the results of the ADF unit-root tests on CDS, ICS, and their 
difference, CDS-ICS. LCDS and LICS respectively refer to the CDS and the ICS obtained 
from the permanent price components after eliminating transitory components. Unit root test 
on CDS-ICS is to test one-to-one cointegration of the pair. If the difference is non-stationary, 
one-to-one cointegration relationship is rejected. The figures are the number of non-stationary 
time series with their percentage values in parenthesis. The significance level is 10%. 
 LCDS LICS LCDS-LICS 
Levels 100 (88%) 111 (98%) 107 (95%) 
First Differences 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
 CDS ICS CDS-ICS 
Levels 103 (91%) 112 (99%) 106 (94%) 
First Differences 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
 
 
Table 5  
Johansen cointegration test  
This table summarises the results of the Johansen cointegration tests on LCDS-LICS pairs 
and CDS-ICS pairs. LCDS and LICS respectively refer to the CDS and the ICS obtained 
from the permanent price components after eliminating transitory components. The figures in 
the first row are the number of firms for which cointegration is detected with their percentage 
values in parenthesis. The significance level is 10%. 
 LCDS-LICS CDS-ICS 
Cointegration 68 (60%) 80 (71%) 
No cointegration 45 (40%) 33 (29%) 
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Table 6  
Information share of CDS market (LCDS)  
This table reports the credit risk discovery contribution of CDS market measured by 
generalized information share (GIS), information share (IS), and component share (GG). The 
first column represents semi-annual sub-periods. LCDS refers to the CDS obtained from the 
permanent price components after eliminating transitory components. For each measure, the 
first column is the average measure, the second column is the number of firms for which the 
measure exceeds 0.5, and the last column is the number of firms converted into percentage. 
 GIS IS GG 
 GIS >0.5 % IS >0.5 % GG >0.5 % 
2006.2 0.53 63 56 0.50 61 54 0.50 59 52 
2007.1 0.51 60 53 0.47 53 47 0.47 52 46 
2007.2 0.48 53 47 0.38 36 32 0.36 29 26 
2008.1 0.40 30 27 0.27 7 6 0.22 6 5 
2008.2 0.39 28 25 0.37 19 17 0.33 17 15 
2009.1 0.55 67 59 0.40 29 26 0.38 32 28 
2009.2 0.49 48 42 0.42 35 31 0.40 34 30 
2010.1 0.60 83 73 0.52 65 58 0.50 54 48 
2010.2 0.50 60 53 0.40 37 33 0.30 19 17 
2011.1 0.37 31 27 0.30 20 18 0.26 22 19 
2011.2 0.42 40 35 0.36 23 20 0.28 16 14 
2012.1 0.38 34 30 0.29 14 12 0.22 14 12 
2012.2 0.38 29 26 0.31 22 19 0.25 19 17 
2013.1 0.45 48 42 0.31 19 17 0.26 19 17 
2013.2 0.34 24 21 0.25 8 7 0.16 7 6 
All 0.45 35 31 0.37 9 8 0.33 8 7 
 
 
 
 
 
  
31 
 
Table 7  
Information share of CDS market (CDS)  
This table reports the credit risk discovery contribution of CDS market measured by 
generalized information share (GIS), information share (IS), and component share (GG). The 
first column represents semi-annual sub-periods. For each measure, the first column is the 
average measure, the second column is the number of firms for which the measure exceeds 
0.5, and the last column is the number of firms converted into percentage. 
 GIS IS GG 
 GIS >0.5 % IS >0.5 % GG >0.5 % 
2006.2 0.49 54 48 0.39 37 33 0.38 36 32 
2007.1 0.45 51 45 0.33 24 21 0.30 25 22 
2007.2 0.45 46 41 0.34 21 19 0.30 18 16 
2008.1 0.39 29 26 0.27 5 4 0.22 4 4 
2008.2 0.38 30 27 0.36 14 12 0.32 12 11 
2009.1 0.54 68 60 0.42 32 28 0.40 39 35 
2009.2 0.49 52 46 0.42 36 32 0.40 34 30 
2010.1 0.61 84 74 0.53 67 59 0.51 65 58 
2010.2 0.52 60 53 0.42 40 35 0.32 21 19 
2011.1 0.36 25 22 0.31 16 14 0.27 21 19 
2011.2 0.44 46 41 0.39 34 30 0.33 24 21 
2012.1 0.40 36 32 0.32 20 18 0.24 14 12 
2012.2 0.38 29 26 0.33 22 19 0.27 22 19 
2013.1 0.47 51 45 0.33 22 19 0.27 19 17 
2013.2 0.35 25 22 0.26 10 9 0.17 8 7 
All 0.45 34 30 0.36 8 7 0.32 6 5 
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Table 8  
Information shares of investment-grade CDS versus speculative-grade CDS  
This table compares the generalized information share (GIS) measure of investment-grade 
CDS with that of speculative-grade CDS. The first column represents semi-annual sub-
periods. For each measure, the first column is the average measure, the second column is the 
number of firms for which the measure exceeds 0.5, the third column is the number of firms 
converted into percentage, and the last column is the number of firms in each group. All 
calculations are based on the permanent price components. 
 Investment Grade Speculative Grade 
 GIS >0.5 % Firms GIS >0.5 % Firms 
2006.2 0.54 53 56 94 0.50 10 53 19 
2007.1 0.52 53 56 94 0.42 7 37 19 
2007.2 0.48 44 47 94 0.49 9 47 19 
2008.1 0.39 23 24 94 0.44 7 37 19 
2008.2 0.39 26 28 94 0.35 2 11 19 
2009.1 0.55 55 59 94 0.53 12 63 19 
2009.2 0.50 40 43 94 0.44 8 42 19 
2010.1 0.62 71 76 94 0.54 12 63 19 
2010.2 0.50 50 53 94 0.50 10 53 19 
2011.1 0.38 28 30 94 0.29 3 16 19 
2011.2 0.42 33 35 94 0.41 7 37 19 
2012.1 0.40 32 34 94 0.26 2 11 19 
2012.2 0.38 25 27 94 0.35 4 21 19 
2013.1 0.47 43 46 94 0.39 5 26 19 
2013.2 0.33 19 20 94 0.39 5 26 19 
All 0.46 32 34 94 0.42 3 16 19 
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Table 9  
Information shares of CCP-cleared CDS versus non-cleared CDS  
This table compares the generalized information share (GIS) measure of CCP-cleared CDS 
with that of non-cleared CDS. The first column represents semi-annual sub-periods. For each 
measure, the first column is the average measure, the second column is the number of firms 
for which the measure exceeds 0.5, the third column is the number of firms converted into 
percentage, and the last column is the number of firms in each group. All calculations are 
based on the permanent price components. 
 CCP Cleared Non Cleared 
 GIS >0.5 % Firms GIS >0.5 % Firms 
2010.1 0.59 23 72 32 0.61 60 74 81 
2010.2 0.49 19 49 39 0.51 41 55 74 
2011.1 0.40 16 35 46 0.34 15 22 67 
2011.2 0.46 24 52 46 0.40 16 24 67 
2012.1 0.42 17 37 46 0.35 17 25 67 
2012.2 0.36 9 17 52 0.39 20 33 61 
2013.1 0.47 26 50 52 0.44 22 36 61 
2013.2 0.31 9 16 56 0.37 15 26 57 
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Table 10  
Determinants of credit risk discovery (LCDS)  
This table reports the results of the panel regression (12). The dependent variable is either 
GIS, IS or GG of LCDS. The independent variables are relative market liquidity between 
stock and CDS markets (RML), credit condition of reference entity (CCON), relative 
frequency of adverse shocks (ADS3), credit rating downgrades events (CRDOWN), 
Bloomberg Financial Condition Index (BFCIUS), Goldman Sachs Financial Condition Index 
(GSFCI), funding cost (FC), and the central clearing counterparty dummy (CCP). ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 GIS IS GG 
Constant 48.62*** 
(0.00) 
49.14*** 
(0.00) 
42.67*** 
(0.00) 
43.05*** 
(0.00) 
39.69*** 
(0.00) 
40.25*** 
(0.00) 
RML 3.84*** 
(0.00) 
2.96*** 
(0.00) 
7.82*** 
(0.00) 
6.65*** 
(0.00) 
10.58*** 
(0.00) 
9.47*** 
(0.00) 
CCON 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
ADS3 -23.92*** 
(0.00) 
-24.39*** 
(0.00) 
-29.82*** 
(0.00) 
-29.13*** 
(0.00) 
-33.70*** 
(0.00) 
-33.91*** 
(0.00) 
CRDOWN 1.43*** 
(0.00) 
1.02*** 
(0.00) 
2.79*** 
(0.00) 
2.37*** 
(0.00) 
3.71*** 
(0.00) 
3.22*** 
(0.00) 
BFCIUS -1.21*** 
(0.00) 
 -1.64*** 
(0.00) 
 -1.54*** 
(0.00) 
 
GSFCI  4.07*** 
(0.00) 
 4.27*** 
(0.00) 
 4.78*** 
(0.00) 
FC -4.23*** 
(0.00) 
-2.51*** 
(0.00) 
-5.31*** 
(0.00) 
-2.55** 
(0.00) 
-5.10*** 
(0.00) 
-2.79** 
(0.00) 
CCP -7.98*** 
(0.00) 
-5.52*** 
(0.00) 
-11.21*** 
(0.00) 
-8.67*** 
(0.00) 
-15.50*** 
(0.00) 
-12.62*** 
(0.00) 
Firm-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed No No No No No No 
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
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Table 11  
Robustness check  
This table reports the results of the panel regression (12). The sample consists of only the 
firms for which CDS and ICS are statistically cointegrated. The dependent variable is either 
GIS, IS or GG of LCDS. The independent variables are relative market liquidity between 
stock and CDS markets (RML), credit condition of reference entity (CCON), relative 
frequency of adverse shocks (ADS3), credit rating downgrades events (CRDOWN), 
Bloomberg Financial Condition Index (BFCIUS), Goldman Sachs Financial Condition Index 
(GSFCI), funding cost (FC), and the central clearing counterparty dummy (CCP). ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 GIS IS GG 
Constant 47.13*** 
(0.00) 
47.74*** 
(0.00) 
37.07*** 
(0.00) 
37.49*** 
(0.00) 
31.01*** 
(0.00) 
31.65*** 
(0.00) 
RML 5.77*** 
(0.00) 
4.58*** 
(0.00) 
9.75*** 
(0.00) 
8.72*** 
(0.00) 
14.86*** 
(0.00) 
13.94*** 
(0.00) 
CCON 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
ADS3 -31.22*** 
(0.00) 
-31.06*** 
(0.00) 
-40.05*** 
(0.00) 
-39.36*** 
(0.00) 
-49.90*** 
(0.00) 
-50.60*** 
(0.00) 
CRDOWN 3.72*** 
(0.00) 
2.75*** 
(0.00) 
3.53*** 
(0.00) 
2.80*** 
(0.00) 
4.22*** 
(0.00) 
3.30*** 
(0.00) 
BFCIUS -1.57*** 
(0.00) 
 -1.35*** 
(0.00) 
 -1.22*** 
(0.00) 
 
GSFCI  4.62*** 
(0.00) 
 3.56*** 
(0.00) 
 4.21*** 
(0.00) 
FC -5.44*** 
(0.00) 
-3.02*** 
(0.00) 
-3.57*** 
(0.00) 
-1.35*** 
(0.00) 
-2.39*** 
(0.00) 
-0.70*** 
(0.00) 
CCP -10.16*** 
(0.00) 
-7.47*** 
(0.00) 
-9.68*** 
(0.00) 
-7.61*** 
(0.00) 
-15.28*** 
(0.00) 
-12.81*** 
(0.00) 
Firm-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed No No No No No No 
R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 
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(a) Distribution of firms across credit ratings 
 
(b) Distribution of firms across industry sectors 
Figure 1  
Distribution of the firms  
This figure illustrates credit ratings and industry sectors of the 113 firms in the sample. Credit 
ratings are based on the S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit Ratings as of 31/12/2013 
and industry classifications are based on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). 
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(a) Cross-Sectional Means of LCDS and LICS 
 
(b) Cross-Sectional Means of CDS and ICS 
Figure 2  
Cross-sectional means of CDS and ICDS  
This figure plots the cross-sectional means of CDS and ICS over the sample period, January 
2006 to December 2013. LCDS and LICS respectively refer to the CDS and the ICS obtained 
from the permanent price components after eliminating transitory components. All the credit 
spreads are expressed in basis points. 
38 
 
 
(a) Information share of LCDS 
 
(b) Information share of CDS 
Figure 3  
Information shares of the CDS market  
This figure plots the information share of CDS market measured by GIS, IS, and GG over the 
sample period. The upper graph is based on the permanent price components (LCDS and 
LICS) and the lower graph is based on the original prices (CDS and ICS). LCDS and LICS 
respectively refer to the CDS and the ICS obtained from the permanent price components 
after eliminating transitory components. 
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(a) Lien and Shrestha (2014) generalized information share (GIS) 
 
(b) Hasbrouck (1995) information share (IS) 
 
(c) Gonzalo and Granger (1995) component share (GG) 
Figure 4  
Impact of transitory components on credit risk discovery leadership  
This chart shows the number of firms for which the credit risk discovery leadership is 
reversed after eliminating transitory components. ’CDS to Stock’ refers to the firms for which 
the leadership has moved from CDS to stock and ’Stock to CDS’ refers to the opposite case. 
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Figure 5  
Information shares of investment-grade CDS versus speculative-grade CDS  
This figure plots the cross-sectional means of generalized information share (GIS) for 
investment-grade CDS and speculative-grade CDS. All calculations are based on the 
permanent price components. 
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(a) Information share of LCDS 
 
(b) Information share of CDS 
Figure 6  
Information shares of the CDS market (robustness)  
This figure plots the generalized information share (GIS) of CDS market for both the full 
sample and a sub-sample of firms for which CDS and ICS are statistically cointegrated. The 
upper graph is based on the permanent price components (LCDS and LICS) and the lower 
graph is based on the original prices (CDS and ICS).  
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